CREagentic is an AI-powered platform for commercial real estate built around The Analyst — a conversational AI employee that handles deal underwriting end-to-end: valuation, BOVs, waterfalls, dispositions, IC memos. You can also access individual analysis tools directly — rent roll parsing, T-12 parsing, environmental report analysis, and more — as power-user deep-links from the dashboard.

How does CREagentic compare to leading analysis software?

CREagentic provides transparent DCF valuation plus The Analyst — chat-driven rather than menu-driven. Individual analysis tools (lease abstraction, LOI redlining, CAM reconciliation, rent roll parsing, T-12 parsing, and more) are accessible directly or through The Analyst's workspace. CREagentic starts free with no implementation fees.

Property managers, asset managers, CRE brokers, accountants, and acquisition teams at REITs, private equity firms, and property management companies use CREagentic.

Yes. The free demo includes 10 one-time AI credits with no credit card required. Paid plans include monthly AI credits; complex documents use more credits. Advanced features like PDF/Excel exports and scenario analysis require a paid plan.

What is AI lease abstraction?

AI lease abstraction uses artificial intelligence to extract structured data from commercial lease documents in a fraction of the time manual review takes. CREagentic extracts 200+ fields including rent schedules, CAM provisions, options, and critical dates.

What is CAM reconciliation?

CAM reconciliation is the annual process of comparing actual common area maintenance expenses to the monthly estimates collected from tenants, resulting in either an additional charge or a credit for each tenant.

Multifamily Delinquency Jumped 46 Basis Points. It Was Always Going to Be Multifamily's Turn.

The July numbers

The Trepp CMBS delinquency rate rose 51 basis points in July to 7.86%. Newly delinquent loans totaled $6.0 billion, and the five largest of them accounted for $2.6 billion: a showroom and exhibition portfolio in North Carolina and Nevada, two Times Square properties, a Chicago office tower and a Seattle office portfolio. Multifamily delinquency rose 46 basis points to 7.69%, which is 154 basis points above July of last year. Trepp traced the multifamily increase to a wave of loans in Ohio, Texas and New York going 30 days late.

Why now

The 2021 multifamily boom was financed with three-year floating-rate bridge loans, often with two one-year extension options that required the property to hit a debt yield or coverage test. The business plan was to renovate units, raise rents 20%, and refinance into agency debt at 4% in 2024. Rents rose less than planned, rates rose more, and the extension tests failed. The extensions that were granted anyway ran out this summer. The loans going 30 days late in Ohio and Texas are that vintage, in the markets that built the most.

The properties are mostly fine. Occupancy in Sun Belt garden apartments is 92% to 94%. Rents are flat to slightly down because supply is still delivering. The capital structure is what failed. A $40 million loan at a 5.5% floating rate on a property earning $2.4 million of NOI does not cover its debt service, and no agency lender will refinance it at that balance when rates are 6.25% and coverage has to be 1.25x.

What an owner in this position should do

Bring the lender a number. The number is the paydown that gets the loan to a balance a permanent lender will take, which in the example above is roughly $31 million. If the sponsor can raise $9 million of preferred equity or fresh capital, the property survives and the equity behind it keeps some value. If it cannot, the honest answer is a sale at a price near the debt, and the sooner that decision is made, the more the sponsor keeps of the guaranty and the reputation.

What does not work is the strategy most owners are running: pay the interest, skip the paydown, and wait for rents. The supply wave in Texas and the Southeast peaks this year and next. Rents will recover in 2027 or 2028. The loan matured in 2026.

For buyers

This is the distress cycle apartment buyers have waited for since 2023, and it is arriving as a stream of individual assets rather than a flood. Lenders are selling notes, sponsors are selling properties, and the pricing is 15% to 25% below 2021 values in the affected markets. Underwrite in-place rents, today's debt cost and a 5.5% to 6% exit cap. Ignore the seller's renovation upside. They already tried it.

The rent roll is the case. Make sure it is right.

An apartment borrower asking a servicer for an extension is asking on the strength of the rent roll. A rent roll with 300 units, concessions, lease-up specials and a property management system that three people have configured over five years is wrong in a few dozen places, and each error is either NOI the borrower is not showing or NOI the borrower is claiming that is not there.

Reconciling the rent roll to the leases by hand at that scale does not happen. Software does it in an afternoon: every lease's rent, concession, term and deposit compared to the system, every mismatch listed. The typical findings are units still showing a concession that ended, renewals recorded at the wrong rent, and deposits that do not match. Fixing them raises the NOI the servicer sees and removes the surprises the buyer's auditor would find. For a borrower whose extension depends on a debt yield test, the corrected number is sometimes the difference between passing and failing it.